) (Clark, J., by designation).
3 The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S.
at 444. "This is what [the Court] meant in Escobedo v. Illinois, 1378 U.S. 478 (1964)]-when [it]
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused." Id. at 444 n.4. Of course, where an interview or interrogation is non-custodial, compliance with the strictures of Miranda is not required. See id. at 477-478; United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970 ); Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642 (9th Ci-. 1969) ; Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1969) ; Lucas v. United States, 408 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1969) .
4 Prior to the initiation of any questioning, a suspect is entitled to be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467-75 (1966) .
In evaluating the validity and sufficiency of a given
To insure adherence to its commands, Miranda announced a rule excluding from evidence any statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, obtained in the absence of warnings.
5 This exclusionary rule fashioned by the Court was to apply in situations where the government attempted to introduce illegally obtained evidence in its casein-chief. It is not clear, however, whether that rule applies when the prosecution seeks to introduce such evidence to impeach a defendant who has taken the witness stand and, in his own direct examination, perjured himself.
Resolution of that question must take into account the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Walder v. United States.' In Walder, a prior narcotics indictment had been dismissed after the defendant had secured suppression of a heroin capsule obtained through an unlawful search and seizure. During his trial on a second narcotics offense committed two years later, the defendant voluntarily took the stand and, during his own direct examination, made a "sweeping denial" that he had ever had narcotics in his possession.
warning, the appellate courts have consistently held that a literal reading of Miranda is improper, for, the words of Miranda do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation to be effective. Words which convey the substance of the warning (1967) . As curious as it may seem, this warning, now so necessary, was the basis on which a confession was once excluded by the English courts. See Regina v. Harris, 1 Cox C.C. 106 (1884); Regina v. Furley, 1 Cox C.C. 76 (1884). 6 384 U.S. at 476. 6 347 U.S. 62 (1954) .
The prosecution was then permitted to introduce the evidence obtained from the earlier search and seizure solely to impeach the defendant's credibility. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, dismissed the petitioner's contention that the introduction of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes contravened the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States: 7 It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against the contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment. 8 The Walder rationale was eagerly embraced and expanded by the federal courts to cover cases involving the use for impeachment purposes of intangible evidence obtained in violation of the McNabb-Mallory doctrine.
9 However, with the coming of Miranda, doubts arose regarding the continued viability of Walder. Today the shadows of controversy are lengthening. While both the federal ' 0 and state" courts are divided on the issue, 7232 U. S. 383 (1914) . In Weeks, the Court held that evidence seized during an illegal search in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal court. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) , expanded the Weeks doctrine to prohibit the derivative use of evidence acquired during an illegal search and seizure.
8 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) . 9 United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2nd Cir), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966) Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1968) ; Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967) (dictum) . See also, United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp. 798, 817 (S.D. N.Y, 1967) 
J.J., dissenting).
The Illinois Supreme Court has expressed "no opinion as to the permissibility of the use of testimony volunteered by defendant [on his direct examination] and unrelated to the suppressed confession." People v. Luna, 37 Ill.2d 299, 308, 226 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1967) . The Illinois Appellate Court has indicated that Walder's validity has not been eroded by Miranda. See People v. LaBatt, 108 fll.App.2d 18, 246 N.E.2d 845 (1969) .
Ten state courts have refused to follow Walder in cases involving Miranda violations: People v. Gardner, 71 Cal. Rptr. 568,266 Cal. App.2d 19 (1968) ; Velande v. People, -Colo.-, 466 P.2d 919 (1970) ; State v. Galasso, 217 So. 326 (Fla. 1968); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969) ; People v. Marsh, 14 Mich. App. 518, 65 N.W.2d 853 (1968) ; State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970) [Vol. 62
IMPEACHING THE PERJUROUS DEFENDANT
Objections to extending the Walder rationale to embrace situations in which violations of Miranda are involved have been predicated on three grounds: (1) the exclusionary rule fashioned by Miranda expressly forbids the use of statements obtained in violation of its commands for impeachment purposes as well as case-in-chief purposes;' (2) the Walder principle will encourage police officers to violate Miranda in order to obtain evidence for impeachment purposes and thus runs afoul of Miranda's deterrence purpose; and (3) Walder unconstitutionally inhibits defendants from taking the stand and testifying in their own behalf.
While even the slightest departure from Miranda's edicts will render the evidence so obtained inadmissible in the government's case-in-chief,1 3 it is submitted that considerations of policy and justice demand that the exclusionary rule of Miranda, like its fourth amendment counterpart, 4 admit of an impeachment exception in those instances where a defendant takes the stand in his own behalf and, under direct examination, commits perjury. 5 In such a case, the prosecution should be 13 384 U.S. at 476. However, where a suspect is known to have an attorney or to have ample funds to secure one, failure to tell a suspect that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed free of charge to represent him will not require application of Miranda's exclusionary rule. 384 U.S. at 473 n. 43.
14 See note 47 infra. 1s It is essential that the defendant initiate the perjury in his direct examination. The prosecution, on cross-examination, cannot ask a leading question designed to elicit a statement contrary to that made to the police. Such a question is improper, and the prosecution cannot thereafter impeach with the illegally obtained evidence. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) . Nor can the prosecution go beyond the scope of the direct examination and attempt to elicit statements at variance with those given at the interrogation stage of the proceedings. See United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470, 475 (3rd Cir. 1968) ; People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d 727 311 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1970) 
16
The degree of reliability of the evidence is of salient importance in determining whether or not the prosecution should be allowed to use the tainted evidence to impeach. Certainly, tangible evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is irrefragably reliable. Thus, not to allow such evidence for impeachment would allow and encourage perjury by the defendant. The "integrity" of our judicial system demands that this not be tolerated. Since intangible evidence clearly does not possess the same degree of reliability as tangible evidence, courts must take care to see that the impeaching evidence is, in fact, reliable:
It is true that if a prior admission were found to be unconstitutionally coerced, the substantial probability that the admission is no more reliable than the contrary testimony of the accused at trial should lead a court to proceed with caution in permitting its use for impeachment purposes. [ Cir. 1969) . See also Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 , 1021 (5th Cir. 1970 . Cf. United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417 (3rd Cir. 1970) . Dimmick v. State, 75 Alaska Rep. 21, 473 P.2d 616 (1970) . But see State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 244, 422 P.2d 581, 582, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) . ("IT]his dichotomy does not appeal to us as constitutionally meaningful.") Thus, a mere violation of Miranda does not mean that statements obtained are involuntary. The courts must examine the evidence to determine if it is voluntary and reliable. However, once determined to be so, it should be admissible for impeachment on "collateral" matters in order to prevent perjury. Admittedly, this will require the courts to undertake certain factual assessments which Miranda does not allow when the [N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in evidence is sought to be introduced in the case-in-chief. However, merely because Miranda sought to obviate the ad hoc determination of the voluntariness of statements given during custodial interrogation in one instance, it does not ineluctably follow that the same policy must be adopted in all others. It is one thing to exclude improperly obtained statements from the casein-chief; it is quite another to exclude them when a defendant attempts to commit perjury, for the interests and considerations involved differ markedly.
Where a defendant takes the stand and asserts that his trial testimony does not vary from the statements he made to the police, almost all courts agree that the improperly obtained statements are admissible for impeachment purposes. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 413 (3rd Cir. 1969 148, 154-55 (1957) . But see People v. Marsh, 14 Mich. App. 518, 65 N.W.2d 853 (1968) . 17 It is essential that the impeaching testimony not be directly related to the case. Determination of what is collateral may not be easy for courts to make, but it does not present difficult theoretical problems. Nor can it be said that the distinction is "virtually unworkable." State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 246, 422 P.2d 581, 583, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) . Indeed, it was not until Miranda that some courts found the distinction difficult to administer. Prior to Miranda, a number of cases had successfully dealt with the problem. In addition to the cases cited in note 9 supra, see Dillion v. United States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968) .
While a rule of automatic exclusion may eliminate difficulties and complications it scarcely accords with the principle that:
The civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within mechanical rules. It necessarily demands the authority of limited direction entrusted to the judge presiding in Federal trials, including a well-established range of judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal, in ruling upon preliminary questions of fact. Such a system as ours must, within the limits here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial judges. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939) . This view was reaffirmed in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1943) .
Further, these objections, based as they are on grounds of expediency, must be rejected, for "[i]f justice requires the fact to be alcertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try." 0. W. fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.Y A literal parsing of that language does seem to support those courts which have felt themselves impelled to conclude that Miranda has sounded the death knell for Walder.
9 However, to paraphrase one of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's happy aphorisms, the notion that because the words of an opinion are plain, its meaning is also plain, is pernicious oversimplication, 2 for "[lt is part of wisdom, particularly for judges, not to be victimized by words." n And since words acquire scope and function from the history of events which they summarize, courts must take care not to isolate a Cir. 1964) , that the question of collateralness was not considered by Walder, must be rejected. The case was argued by Paul Porter of the prominent Washington firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter. An examination of his brief reveals that counsel indeed called the rule against impeachment on collateral matters to the Court's attention. Among the authorities cited in that brief was United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1948) which held that "the answer of the witness on crossexamination with respect to a collateral matter introduced for impeachment purposes concluded the inquiry." Id. at 376-77. Walder clearly rejected this evidentiary argument. Moreover, invocation of the rule is a matter of discretion for the court. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150,230 (1939 [Vol. 62 few words from the underlying rationale of an opinion. In sum, the question presented is not what do the above cited words of Miranda say, but rather what do they meap.
Even from the most laconic reading of Miranda, it is clear that the question relating to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes was not before the Court; and it is submitted that the Court did not pretend to deal with it.n The Chief Justice's single, oblique, loosely phrased reference to impeachment was designed to bolster an eradication of the difference between inculpatory and exculpatory statements; it was not designed to overrule Wakier sub silentio. with the "interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring." Id. at 456. It sought to find "a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation", and it attempted to advance "proper limitation[s] on custodial interrogation" in order to insure that "protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions" and other practices of that nature would be eliminated. Id. at 446-65.
Egalitarianism also seemed to play a part in the decision. The Court stressed that not only the cases before it, but the vast majority of confession cases with which it had dealt in the past involved those unable to retain counsel. Thus, to implement the fifth amendment's guarantee, Miranda required counsel for the indigent suspect. In this way, the Court attempted to insure that the fifth amendment's application to the poor would be more than "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificient bequest in a pauper's will." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
23Had the majority intended to make inroads on WaIder, it is unlikely that the four dissenters, (one of whom, Clark, J., was in the majority in Walder) would have made no protest. And it is unlikely that the Chief Justice, who was in the majority in Walder, would have been so cavalier in laying to rest one of his own offspring. the essence of a provision forbidding acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely that evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. 26 The Walder Court found Silverthorne's words a prophecy to inspire rather than an immutable command to be slavishly obeyed without regard to the attendent circumstances. Hence, it modified the rule in accordance with the lessons of experience.F If Silverthorne's seemingly irrecrusable statement admits of exceptions, there is every reason to suppose that the Chief Justice's statement in Miranda does so as well.
In fact, such a supposition mirrors the oft-repeated and consistently followed principle of constitutional adjudication that the Court does "not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts presented in the record." 2 Indeed, Chief Justice Warren himself has warned against gratuitous innuendos and expressions of opinion on matters not before the Court. He has expressed, on more than one occasion, his awareness that the experience of centuries is behind the wisdom of not deciding, either explicitly or by "atmospheric pressure," matters that do not come to the Court with the impact of necessity. It has not been the custom of the Court, in deciding the cases which come before it, to write lengthy and abstract dissertations upon questions which are neither presented by the record nor necessary to a proper disposition of the issue raised.
I would prefer not to write on many of the difficult questions which the opinion discussed until the facts of a particular case make such writing necessary. In my view, the reasons which have compelled the Court to develop the law on a case-bycase approach, to declare legal principles only in the context of specific factual situations, and to avoid expounding more than is necessary for the decision of a case are persuasive. (emphasis added). See also Grosso v. United States, 390
The Court's sensitivity to these principles is illustrated by two significant cases. Miranda to retrials. The issue simply was not presented." 11
What emerges with unmistakable clarity is an injunction against the "tyranny of literalness."7 For, by yielding to this "tyranny," courts create their own verbal prisons. 8 Care must be taken to avoid applying a given fact situation to a rule without regard to the reasons that brought the rule into existence.' 9 It is unfortunate that those courts which have found the language of Miranda so imperious did not more fully consider that the rules laid down by the Court were wrought under the pressure of a particular factual setting which was in no way related to the doctrinal underpinnih gs of Walder. It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expression are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated. 40The foregoing argument has assumed that the majority's reference to impeachment in Miranda was not dictum. The contention is not that the Court went beyond the facts of the case in announcing a principle; but rather that, when considered in context, the reference to impeachment takes on a different complexion than it does when isolated. Assuming, arguendo, that the reference is dictum, it must still be rejected, for the distinction between decision and dicta is a sine qua non of constitutional adjudication. Distinguishing between dicta and decision, between what was said and what was done, is nothing less than distinguishing between ratiocination on the one hand and naked conclusions on the other. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (1966) indicated that Miranda was chiefly concerned with proscribing interrogation practices which the Court found to be "destructive of human dignity," and "at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself." 384 U.S. at 457-58. Since the majority believed that "'IT]he quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it used in the enforcement of its criminal law,' " it was convinced that unsupervised and unregulated interrogations were inconsistent with the boast that ours in an accusatorial and not an inquisitional system. Id. at 480.
In conclusion, Miranda sought to advance "proper limitation[s] upon custodial interrogation" to insure that "protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions" and other "practices of this sort will be eradicated in the foreseeable future." Id. at 446-47. Thus it is submitted that Miranda's exclusionary rule, like its antecedent and its fourth amendment counterpart is designed to discourage official misconduct by depriving the government of the fruits of its lawlessness. Those who contend that Walder should be overruled, or at least not extended to Miranda situations, have sought comfort in the philosophy of the exclusionary rule. They contend that police misconduct will be encouraged if statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach the testimony of a perjurous defendant. The argument rests on the assumption that the police will consciously violate Miranda in an attempt to obtain incriminating statements which the prosecution can use for impeachment notwithstanding their knowledge that these statements will be inadmissible in the case-in-chief.
Illustrative is the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. Brewton:4
If we should today adopt a restrictive application of the exclusionary rule, the result could be a major step backward. This court would, in effect, be saying to the overzealous that police officers will be free in the future to interrogate suspects secretly, at arms length, without counsel, and without advice, so long as they use means consistent with threat-or-promise voluntariness, and so long as they understand that they may file the information only for use to keep the defendant honest. Thus, the police could, at their option, take a calculated risk: By giving up the possibility of using the suspect's statements in the state's case, they could obtain by unconstitutional means and store away evidence to use if the defendant should elect upon trial to take the stand.
As will be seen, Brewton is a classic example of what can happen when a court eschews careful analysis in the mistaken assumption that its conclusions are self-evident and self-authenticating. And it amply confirms the wisdom of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation that the reasoning which attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers. justifies a conclusion should be made manifest in the judicial opinion in which it is announced. 5 Brewton boldly assumes that police might gamble. They might refrain from offering a suspect the Miranda warnings and thereby surrender the possibility of using subsequent statements in the prosecution's case-in-chief in order to obtain such statements for impeachment purposes should the defendant elect upon trial to take the stand."
The Brewton court's assertion is speculative in the extreme, and it is a commonplace that tendentious speculations will not solve problems with intractable variables such as arise under the exclusionary rule. It will not do merely to say that police officers might be encouraged to violate Miranda, or that they could take a "calculated risk." The focus of the inquiry must be more critical and discerning if the facts are to bear a necessarily close relation to reality. 51 Thus, before the exclusionary rule can come into play, it must be shown that there exists a substantial likelihood that by extending Walder police will take the calculated risk of which Brewton speaks. Mere possibilities based on refined speculation will not suffice. Indeed, the court did not, in any reasoned way, deal with the various factors which a police officer must evaluate and weigh prior to making the decision whether to inform a suspect of his rights; it merely announced a conclusion which on the surface appears plausible. Whether the police will take the "calculated risk" and forego the opportunity to obtain case-in-chief evidence in order to get impeaching evidence depends upon the officers' rational assessment of the total situation.
It follows that police must assess the possibility that information obtained, if any, in the absence of warnings will actually be available for use at trial for impeachment purposes.5 s That will depend upon whether five factors ultimately coalesce at trial: (1) the defendant takes the stand: (2) the defendant, in his direct examination, goes beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crime; (3) the prosecution decides to use the statements; (4) the court determines that the statements do not bear directly on the offense charged; and (5) the court determines that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial: Since any decision to consciously seek impeachment evidence inust take account of all these factors, the cognitive process which must be employed is not as facile as Brewton would lead one to believe.
Theoretically, it appears that the police will take the "calculated risk" only where they can rationally assume that the chances of the five aforementioned factors coalescing at trial exceed the chances that the suspect will stand mute if given Miranda warnings. Police are not so legally sophisticated that they could actually engage in such a cognitive process. However, Brewton's entire argument rests on the presumption, dearly through implicitly expressed, that the police are so knowledgeable. Indeed, the Brewton rationale necessitated that assumption, for if the police do not actually possess the acumen attributed to them, the entire deterrence argument crumbles under its own weight.
The likelihood that the police will obtain a confession or admission from one whom they have warned is infinitely greater than the likelihood that statements obtained in the absence of warnings will actually be available for use at trial. Thus, it cannot realistically be supposed that a police officer, no matter how venal he may be, will refrain 53 Of course, this presupposes that without the warnings the suspect would be cooperative. This presupposition has little intrinsic merit when the police are dealing with people who "know the ropes." from giving Miranda warnings, thereby losing important case-in-chief evidence in the vain hope that in exchange he may obtain evidence bearing solely on credibility. The contrary argument blinks reality.
Judicial opinions are not fungible, each possessing equal intrinsic value. The worth of an opinion is proportionate to the degree to which it commends itself to reason and is consonant with the realities of life." Measured against these principles, it is submitted that Brewton should not be followed. It is not, however, merely the fecklessness of of Brewton's arguments which cautions against restricting Walder; there are affirmative grounds upon which to justify Walder's application to Miranda."
To determine whether the directive force of a precedent should be restricted, an analysis of its function must be entertained, for a world cannot be ran on the principles of formal logic. The test of a rule's worth must be empirical in character. It is necessary to study the social consequences of the rule's application and deduce therefrom its logic.
6
The seventeen year history of the Walder rule in cases involving violations of the fourth amendment represents a persuasive foundation for the claim that its application to Miranda will not encourage police misconduct. Walder has not diminished the vitality of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. Nor has it motivated the police to violate the amendment's precepts in order to gain incriminating evidence for impeachment purposes. If Walder has not provided the impetus for law enforcement officials to violate the fourth amendment, it surely does not follow that it will now provide the motive force for viola-"iT]hat which makes no sense to the common understanding surely is not required by any fictive notions of law or even by the more sentimental attitude toward criminals." Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Th arguments against Wader which have relied on the deterrence rationale bear a similarity to arguments of an earlier day which sought to persuade the courts that anything even remotely connected with police illegality was "tainted." Insofar as it represents the Supreme Court's attitude towards excessively strained casuistic arguments, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) , is pertinent:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. 59 the Court held that evidence obtained in violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act6° was admissible in state criminal proceedings. The hope was expressed that enforcement of the statutory prohibition in §605 could be achieved under the penal provisions of the Act. But after sixteen years experience proved that to be a vain hope, the federal exclusionary rule was made applicable to state criminal proceedings in Lee v. Florida. 61 Finally, our decision today is counseled by experience.... Research has failed to uncover a single reported prosecution of a law enforcement officer for violation of §605 since the statute was enacted. We conclude, as we concluded in Elkins and in Mapp, that nothing short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the federal law in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it. 6°47 U.S.C. §605 (1964) . This statute prohibits divulging the contents of any interstate or foreign communication by wire or.radio to persons other than the addressee or his agent.
61392 U.S. 378, 381 (1968) (emphasis added).
In Elkins v. United States,1 the issue before the Court was whether evidence obtained by state officers during a search, which if conducted by federal officers would have violated the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, was admissible in a federal criminal trial. Aware that resolution of the issues was not to be dictated by "[ra]ere logical symmetry and abstract reasoning," 6 the Court examined the experience of the federal courts under the exclusionary rule enunciated in Weeks v. United States." After considering the "impressive experience of the states" and exhaustively examining the considerations of federalism, the court held:
These then are the considerations of reason and experience which point to the rejection of a doctrine that would freely admit in a federal trial evidence seized by state agents in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. " underscores the salient role of experience in fashioning and applying exclusionary rules. There the Court answered the contention that the deterrence rationale logically dictates that all evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment must be excluded regardless of whether the evidence was seized from the defendant or from another.
[No previous decisions of this Court] hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment.... Without experience showing the contrary, we should not assume that this new statute [outlawing unauthorized electronic surveillance] will be cavalierly disregarded or will not be enforced against transgressors. 67 Despite the improbability that Walder will encourage Miranda violations, concerned and chary voices caution against the admittance of any unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the ground 364 U. S. 206 (1960) . [Vol. 62
that even "a slight incentive is apparently sufficient to encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct." If, however, the impeaching evidence is related to the offense charged, the collateral use doctrine does undercut the policy in question by providing the police with an incentive to use illegal methods in order to acquire evidence against the defendant. In this regard it should be noted that a slight incentive is apparently sufficient to encourage the police to engage in illegal conduct. This commentator contends that the collateral use doctrine furnishes the requisits incentive for police to violate Miranda in two ways:
The doctrine permits... illegally obtained evidence to be used to discredit the defendant's testimony if he takes the stand. Alternatively, the availability of such evidence discourages the defendant from taking the stand. Id. at 927. The first argument parallels that in Brewton and has previously been answered. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text. The second argument misses the mark, for the focus here is not on the dubious tendency of the evidence once obtained, but on the motivation of the police. Surely, one cannot realistically contend that the police will forego the opportunity to obtain an admissible confession in order to get collaterally impeaching evidence in the hope that the defendant will thereby be discouraged from taking the stand.
Another commentator has opted for a "complete prohibition against use of all unlawfully obtained evidence" in order to "remove all incentive for illegal police behavior. The announcement of an absolute rule may have psychological impact on the police, if nothing else." Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Cm. L. Rv. 939, 946 (1967 It is not realistic to characterize the defendant's perjury in Walder as an "unnecessarily broad denial." Furthermore, one must possess the hardiest credulity to accept the Supreme Court's limitation on the exclusionary rule as a "minor distinction." Whatever one's view of the ultimate wisdom of Walder's determination that an extension of the Weeks doctrine to allow a defendant to affirmatively resort to perjurous testimony in reliance on the government's disability to challenge his credibility would be "a perversion of the Fourth Amendment," 347 U.S. at 65, few would deny that it is a good deal more than a "technicality."
69 1n the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "On probative evidence should be employedY 0 In its attempts to come to grips with this antinomy, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that the solution lies not in the insensitive invocation of obdurate rules or tests mechanical, for both objects of desire can never be fully realized. Hence, some compromise is necessary lest "in the clash of jarring rivalries the pretending absolutes will destroy themselves and ordered freedom too." 71 In the final analysis, one principle emerges from the cases: when the public interest in presenting all evidence which is relevant and probative is compelling and the deterrent function served by exclusion is minimal, the exclusionary rule should not be invoked. There is no adequate substitute for this balancing test, anathema though it be to many. To retreat from that delicate test in favor of a rule of automatic exclusion whenever there exists the slightest possibility of police misconduct would be folly. For "it scarcely helps to give so wide a berth to Charybdis' maw that one is in danger of being impaled upon Scylla's rocks." 7
The Court had occasion to employ this test in Alderman v. United StatesY It was there argued that the deterrence rationale logically dictates that all unconstitutionally obtained evidence be excluded from criminal trials without regard to whether the defendant had standing to complain of the illegal activity. After balancing the competing considerations, the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truthY 4 the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, [24] [25] Thus, even if it is conceded that a restriction upon Walder will have some marginal deterrent effect, it does not follow that courts are compelled to adopt the rule of total exclusion advocated by Brewton. Whatever minimal degree of deterrence would be served by extending the exclusionary rule is insufficient to override or justify further encroachments upon the public interest in preventing those accused of crime from taking the stand and committing perjury. To deny the prosecution the use of a defendant's voluntary, reliable, prior inconsistent statements which relate only collaterally to the offense charged and which can be used only to impeach credibility is to trivialize the very meaning of the exclusionary rules.
While the major thrust of the exclusionary rules is a deterrent one, they have come to serve another vital function-the "imperative of judicial integrity":
Courts which sit under our Constitution... will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. This doctrine received its explicit enunciation in U. S. 18 (1967) , where the Court promulgated a harmless constitutional error rule which recognized "that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of conviction." Id. at 22. However, once a constitutional infraction has been shown, the government must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. The Chapman rule was designed to obviate reversal as a mandatory remedy in cases involving errors of constitutional dimension and to substitute judgment for the a priori application of a rule of automatic reversal which was but an unnecessary concession to technicality and thus wholly antithetical to a jurisprudence of conceptions.
Yet it has been argued that the "harmless" error violates the deterrence rationale. The proponents contended that some police would violate constitutional standards in the hope that the trial judge would erroneously admit the evidence obtained and that an appellate court will find the error harmless.
The decision in Chapman recognized that the increment to deterrence of improper police practices which would result from a rule of automatic reversal would be negligible, and, in any event, was far outweighed by the need for a harmless constitutional error rule.
71 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) . See also Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1968) ; Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n. 10 (1968) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 321 (1942) . Compare Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946) . It is good to see your handwriting again and to welcome you back from your youthful larks-my time for them has gone by. The fatigue of Washington to Boston and Boston to Washington is enough for me, and I walk very little. I am interested by what you tell of Charybdis and the truant Scylla. I dissented in the case of tapping telephone wires. The C. J. who wrote the prevailing opinion, perhaps as a rhetorical device to obscure the difficulty, perhaps merely because he did not note the difference, which perhaps I should have emphasized more, spoke of the objection to tha evidence as based on its being obtained by "unethical" means (horrid phrase), although he adds & by a misdemeanor under the laws of Washington. I said that the State of Washington had made it a crime and that the Government could not put itself in the position of offering to pay for a crime in order to get evidence of another crime. Brandeis wrote much more elaborately, but I didn't agree with all that he said. I should not have printed what I wrote, however, if he had asked me to. HoLMEs-PoLLocK LETTERS 222 (Howe ed. 1942) (editor's footnotes omitted). Justice Brandeis' "much more elaborate" dissent has been described by professor Paul Freund, law secretary to the justice during the 1927-28 term:
It is obvious that the opinion grew in strength and eloquence as it hammered out and as it evolved, from a response to the unpleasantness in which Samuel Warren found himself, through the ethical principle of unclean hands to the ultimate philosophy of man's spiritual nature which Brandeis found embodied in our Constitution. The crescendo of feeling rises from stage to state-as Brandeis is driven to explore ever more deeply the foundations of individual society. An objection to extension of the Walder doctrine to cases involving Miranda violations concerns the possible inhibitory effect on a defendant's exercise of his right to testify. It has been argued that the "ability of the prosecution to use portions of the statements illegally obtained from the defendant for impeachment purposes may... force the defendant to forego his right to testify in his own behalf." 8 However, a concession that a defendant may not take the witness stand because he is apprehensive that his testimony may be impeached by illegally obtained evidence does not settle the matter. This concession marks not the end but the beginning of a necessarily more discriminating analysis than has been undertaken by those courts which have subscribed to the infringement of the right to testify argument.
The source of the right to testify is ultimately to be found in the vague admonitory provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 8 5 That right is accorded a defendant in order that he may adequately present his version of a case to the jury. But it is a hoary platitude that no witness has the right to commit perjury. Thus, the right to testify cannot be said to embrace a right to commit perjury, for "[als a witness, a defendant is no more to be... clothed with sanctity, simply because he is under accusation" than he is "to be visited with condemnation." 5 6 Consequently, to deny a defendant the opportunity to engage in conduct that is calculated to adversely affect the rights of public justice and the integrity of the fact finding process cannot be said to unconstitutionallyabridge his right to take the stand in his own behalf. 57 In sum, Walder deprives a defendant of nothing to which he is lawfully entitled; it merely denies him a license to commit perjury with impunity.
It is universally accepted that when a defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, he is subject to cross-examination and can be impeached in the same manner as any other witness. Furthermore, testimony given by a plaintiff for his own benefit in a civil suit is admissible against him in a subsequent criminal proceedingss It seems obvious that a defendant who knows that his testimony may be impeached will be more reluctant to take the stand than if he were allowed to testify free from a searching investigation by the prosecutor. It is no less apparent that in a particular case, the knowledge that his testimony may later be used against him in a criminal proceeding may deter a plaintiff from presenting his claim. While in both instances a burden is imposed upon the right to testify, in neither is it impermissible.
Indeed, if lawfully obtained prior inconsistent statements can be used for impeachment without imposing an unconstitutional burden on a defendant's right to testify, it is difficult to perceive how the use of unlawfully obtained statements can impermissibly burden that right. Since the intrinsic nature of the evidence is the same regardless of the manner of acquisition, the burden, if there be any, must stem from the illegality of that acquisition 8 9 Accordingly, the question is whether the illegality in the manner of acquisition imposes a burden on a defendant different either in kind or degree from that which would be imposed upon him had the evidence been obtained legally. In short, it must be determined whether a defendant would be more reluctant to testify in his own behalf when the evidence available for impeachment has been unlawfully obtained than he would be had it been lawfully acquired.
For illustrative purposes, assume that identical, voluntary and reliable statements were obtained from defendants X and Y. X's statement was obtained illegally while Y's was obtained legally. it may well be that defendant X will be somewhat reticent about taking the stand and perjuring himself. However, this hesitancy is different neither in kind nor degree from that which defendant Y experiences, for the evidence available for impeachment is identical in both cases. Indeed, it is manifest that the intrinsic nature of the evidence is unrelated to and unaffected by the manner in which it was secured. It is equally apparent that in determining whether to take the witness stand and risk impeachment, neither X nor Y will be concerned with how the evidence was obtained; their concern will properly center on its contents. Consequently, no greater burden is imposed on X's right to testify by virtue of the fact that the impeaching evidence was unlawfully acquired.
In sum, the legaility of the method of acquisition of the evidence has no legal bearing on the narrow question whether Walder will cause a defendant to forego his right to testify. The decision whether to exercise that right is unrelated, both legally and factually, to the manner in which the police gathered the evidence. Rather, the decision to testify depends upon a melange of imponderables which 81 This presupposes, of course, that the illegality of acquisition was not such as to render subject the voluntariness and reliability of the statements.
[Vol. 62 instance, by simple parity of reasoning it cannot do so in the latter.
A careful reading of Simmons lends the distinct impression that it permits the prosecution to impeach a defendant with evidence given at a suppression hearing. The Court took pains to point out that its holding precluded only the use of suppression hearing evidence on the issue of guilt.
95
The Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has incorporated this holding in its preliminary draft of 11 Note the meticulous language employed by the Court in restricting its holding:
Finally, it is contended that it was reversible error to allow the Government to use against Garret on the issue of guilt the testimony given by him upon his.., motion to suppress....
[I-le contends that testimony given by a defendant to meet such requirements should not be admissible against him on the question of guilt and innocence. We agree.
We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-394 (1968) When viewed in proper perspective, the right to testify argument is not impressive. In future examinations of the question, courts might do well to keep before them as a living faith Mr. Justice Holmes' subtle admonition: "The word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified." 99
CONCLUSION
The application of Walder to Miranda situations neither runs afoul of the deterrence rationale nor the "imperative of judicial integrity." The desiderata underlying the exclusionary rules are not violated by allowing impeachment of a perjurous defendant. However, by interpreting those rules to demand that unconstitutionally seized, though reliable, evidence be inadmissible for impeachment, perjury would be condoned thereby seriously jeopardizing the integrity of the federal judiciary and the fact-finding process itself.
Criminal defendants ought not to be allowed to take the stand and commit perjury with impunity while courts stand helplessly by, fettered by a rule of their own making, a rule which is neither demanded by the Constitution nor by any sound principle of justice. Walder achieved a workable accommodation between the rule of total exclusion and that which would authorize unlimited admittance of evidence; it must not be abandoned. 
Editor's Note
As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. New York,.U.S.. (2/24/71). In Harris, Chief justice Burger, writing for a 5-4 majority, found that "trustworthy" statements procured in violation of Miranda are admissible for impeachment purposes even if more than collaterally related to the crime charged. It is felt that this article answers many of the questions left unresolved by Harris and will be a useful guide to the implementation of that decision.
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